Libertarian Paternalism...

I've recently gotten into some minor scuffles with others when pointing out that Barack Obama is not a redistributive socialist but, in fact, largely appears to be an adherent to "Libertarian Paternalism," a strain of policy that may be classified as "4th Generational Chicago School." Not surprising, given that Obama served for a time as a professor at the Univ. of Chicago Law School. In General, 2nd Generation Chicago school is associated with Friedman and monetarism. 3rd Generation Chicago School would be more oriented around Robert Lucas and Rational Expectations. 4th Generation Chicago School would be centered around Thaler and Sunstein's "Choice Architecture," a concept stemming from scientific advances in the fields of behavioral economics and burgeoning new fields such as neuroeconomics. Essentially, studies show that humans are not Neoclassical rational, utility maximizing agents, but are, likely, in fact, only boundedly rational. I broached this topic a few months ago in my post Evolutionary Game Theory and Anarchy, in promoting an evolutionary game theory framework for modeling the stability of anarchist organizations.

To be sure, "Libertarian Paternalism" is not a unanimous position held at Chicago: Becker and Posner, for example, are strong critics. To those who charge Libertarian Paternalism is oxymoronic, I suppose Thaler and Sunstein anticipated this exact criticism with their paper “Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron" published in the Chicago Law Review a few years ago.

My own position is that I've increasingly come to the conclusion that libertarianism is incompatible with any model of a monopolistic enforcement agent. Whether the state enforcement model is minarchist, softly paternalistic, or full-blown corporatist mandate/prohibition, "State Libertarianism" itself is an oxymoron. Therefore any sympathy I may exhibit toward Obama and his libertarian paternalism is mere practical ranking preference over the likes of McCain and Clinton, who would adhere more to the corporatist mandate/prohibition model. And that's it.

I tend to agree that libertarian isn't compatible with a monopolistic enforcement agent, but I'm also not sure if an anarchic system is "stable." And so we keep having to talk about a situation that may not be ideal, but at least is in equilibrium and stable--and provides for the maximum amount of liberty and freedom.

Of course, stability in the system may be dependent on what we do as actors.

I think both history and theory demonstrate that "anarchist government" can be quite stable, it's that history hasn't been kind to such organizations when they come under external attack, especially from the State. This is sort of the theme in De Jasay's "Justice and it's Surrounding." De Jasay relies on the "Rational choice" methodology for his framework which assume Neoclassical rationality in utility maximization. I have come to ascribe to a more "Generalized Rational Choice" framework, which only assumes bounded rationality...and this is where evolutionary game theory comes into play(which is a generalized dynamical theory, not a static theory like traditional game theory).

I classify anarchism into two categories, market anarchism and utopian anarchism. "Utopian anarchism" is no governmental structure(no need for any division of labor) at all and would only be stable in a world with no scarcity. In a world where scarcity exists, and therefore, economics, it's "market anarchism." Any organizational structure that has even the most rudimentary form of division of labor, such as the hunter/gatherer model of the caveman/cavewoman tribe, is market anarchism.

Libertarianism, however, is a higher-order evolutionary form from mere market anarchism. The caveman/cavewoman tribe struggling day-to-day as hunters and gatherers is NOT "libertarianism." That's absurd. Libertarianism only comes into play only after the division of labor of any "governmental entity" reaches a certain level of complexity. Only in that context does a reasonable ability to voluntarily "secede" from an enforcement mechanism have any relevance. From my perspective, the ultimate essence of libertarianism is reasonable ability of voluntary secession from enforcement mechanisms in a sufficiently advanced "society" capable of providing such alternative mechanisms.

From my definition, this is why I think "Malthusian-level" collapse events is utterly incompatible with Libertarianism, even if such temporarily results in a return to more "primitive" market anarchist organization. That's not libertarianism, and you are just resetting the clock with a whole lot of human suffering thrown in for a "re-evolution" of the State.

That's why I advocate left-libertarians embrace the "jump," not the "collapse." Technological jumps or singularities can result in a new taxonomical class of a market anarchist government structure that is sufficiently advanced for bounded rational agents to not only resist external state aggression but to accommodate the libertarian principle of voluntary secession.

I have a book, called "The Sovereign State and Its Competitors" by Hendrik Spruyt, that reviews the rise of the sovereign state/nation-state in Europe in contrast to city-states, the Holy Roman Empire and its feudal structure, the Catholic Church, and association of cities in leagues. Here is a review, since I actually haven't read the book as in depth as I'd like: http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?issueID=30&articleID=377

"Once some nation-states had become firmly established, they developed a system of treaties and characteristics (e.g., diplomats and fixed borders) from which nonstate organizations were gradually weeded out because their structures were more (as with the city leagues) or less (as with the city-states) incompatible with the “game” among the nation-states. This insight is crucial to understanding why the “nationalization” of politics in Europe gained increasing momentum after the fifteenth century, ultimately establishing itself as the single mode of politics in the nineteenth century. Once some identically structured partners had emerged, relationships between them became easier, placing pressure on the nonstate areas to adopt similar structures in order to “sit at the table with the big guys.” Thus the development of the nation-state in countries such as France, England, and Hapsburg Spain led to a specific system of mutual relations–“the international system”–based on international custom and law. This system encouraged the conversion of remaining nonstate entities into nation-states."

I think this provides some interesting context to discussions on the stability of anarchism from external threats.

I'll have to think about "jumps" and "collapses" more. Like it or not, I'm worried about a collapse right now.