Anarchism vs Social Engineering

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Submitted by ka1igu1a on Mon, 2008-11-24 08:53.

IOZ in his post, Liberalism. Libertarianism. Anarchism, asks:

Why is a third-party, violence-by-proxy guarantee of the diffuse individual ownership of parceled land and goods, called "property," not called "social engineering"? What is the innate legitimacy of such a system? The answer: such a system provides the conditions necessary to achieve the greatest general welfare and prosperity. The follow-up: doesn't that open the door to other schemes to promote welfare and prosperity? Where's the deontological line?

IOZ resorts to utilitarianism to justify private property rights but rightly infers that a consequentialist basis for property rights opens the door for alternatives other than simple utility maximization. The obvious counter case is "Modern Progressivism" which basically applies the Rawlsian Justice Principle of Maximin to the Social Contract, meaning social outcomes that maximize the utility of the "least fortunate" are to be preferred over alternative outcomes such as straight utility maximization. Rawls employs a "Veil of Ignorance" device as an instrument of mutual consent to argue that his theory of justice would be preferred by participating parties over competing theories of justice, such as the libertarian or IOZ's utilitarian accounts. That is to say, if agents did not know beforehand where they would end up on the totem pole(whether, say, near the top or, perhaps, near the bottom), agents would therefore prefer to maximize the worst possible outcome.

Game shows that have scenarios where a contestant can choose to keep his/her current modest prize X or risk for it much greater possible prize Y hidden behind either Door #1 or Door #2(of course, if you choose the wrong door you end up with nothing) can serve as an interesting experimental testing ground for Rawls' Maximin preference assertions, but in in the context of the State, Rawls' theory of justice begins to look an awful like a case of mere social engineering. The first obvious problem with Rawlsian justice carried out by the State is the notion that central planners can somehow make interpersonal utility comparison calculations to begin with. The second problem can be illustrated succinctly by the the likes of the Drug War, which makes a mockery of Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance" assumptions when it comes to impartiality of institutions, since the Drug War overwhelmingly and systematically impacts the poor and minorities. Rawls opposed libertarian justice because he thought it implied an unacceptable "standard of deviation" between those at the top and those at the bottom, but it's clear that the Progressive Drug War State itself is a deeply anti-Rawlsian Device.

The modern progressive's willingness to paper over the anti-Rawlsian nature of the American State is a nice lead-in to IOZ's observation:

Once you begin to justify a state, the line between what is and isn't in its compelling interest blur. Establishing some entity, some agency, whose purpose is to establish and maintain a base-level social order for the provision, at least pursuit, of general welfare and prosperity (personal or otherwise) is social engineering.

This can be re-stated. If it's clear that the State violates the libertarian, the Rawlsian, and the utilitarian conceptions of justice, what's left of the function of the State but to be an instrument of Social Engineering?

This leads IOZ to propose:

Why not just advocate for anarchy? Why not advocate for a system in which no third-party collective, no state entity, has coercive authority over anyone.

Well, you say, then someone will just gather up a gang and establish a . . .

Which may be true. But if that's the case, what's the bright distinction between chartering a gang and knuckling under to one?

IOZ's suggestion prompted a a spate of comments centered around distinctions between State gangs and Warlord gangs, anarchist stability, and the example of Somalia thrown in for good measure.

Somolia is a good example where where lack of a State has increased the overall utility. From a utilitarian justice perspective, Somolia is better off without the State. However, the unproductive Warlord fighting over protection rents demonstrates how violent market anarchy can be when the market for protection is unable to resolve the coordination problem. Of course, such coordination problems have no hope being resolved through mutual consent because of the perpetual meddling from external States and the UN in trying to promote one group/gang over another. The recent spate of Somali piracy that now has demonstrated it can threaten gulf state oil shipping traffic routes likely portends that the international community is going to be more proactive in imposing a political solution on Somolia in the near future(One note about Somali piracy that goes unreported is the extent that foreign nations have engaged in violating Somali martime property rights, in terms of toxic waste dumping and "illegal fishing." In such cases, piracy would be an acceptable form of defense). In short, Somalia is exhibit A why long-term peaceful anarchist orders are unlikely to emerge or remain stable in the context of external Statist meddling.

So the answer to IOZ is terms of chartering a gang vs knuckling under one is sort of a false dichtomy. In the end, you knuckle under one. Those who argue that the legitimacy of Statist Gangs resides in some broader method of selection rituals,e.g., say, democratic voting, ignore the fact that from a rational choice perspective, voting is more or less irrational.

Nevertheless,a question that has to be asked is how stable is central planning social engineering, really?

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the Utilitarian argument for property

#6933 On Sat, 2008 11 29 09:27 adam ricketson said,

I'm sure you are aware of the Natural Law argument for private property, which gets around this whole "social engineering" thing (though it has its own issues).

I agree that the utilitarian argument implies social engineering, and I don't think that it is a very convincing argument for libertarianism. Utilitarianism always opens the door for a lot of ambiguity, and I suspect that utilitarian reasoning can support radically different views of government action based on rather arbitrary differences in our perception of the world (how much we defer to experts, how much we like large organizations, how much we (dis)trust various groups in society, our estimate of risks from environmental disaster). I think that for American society, utilitarian reasoning typically results in something like Clintonian neo-liberalism, not libertarianism.

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Natural Rights...

#6940 On Sun, 2008 11 30 01:39 ka1igu1a said,

Yeah, Adam, I'm quite aware of Natural Rights :)

Self-ownership is the central heart of libertarianism, and it doesn't matter, IMHO, how you presuppositionally justify such. From self-ownership flows the right to the fruits of one's own labor and the right to be free from prior coercive claims and/or impersonal duties. Thus self-ownership implies private property and NAP. However, when it comes to land and natural resources, in terms of the "Homesteading Principle," I take a much more of a Georgian view. I would posit enforcement of unequal claim of limited land and resources has a lot to do with Statism in the first place from a class perspective. As such, libertarianism likely requires a steady diet of "frontierism" to be viable and overcome the problem of class.

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social engineering?

#6934 On Sat, 2008 11 29 09:36 adam ricketson said,

If it's clear that the State violates the libertarian, the Rawlsian, and the utilitarian conceptions of justice, what's left of the function of the State but to be an instrument of Social Engineering?

How exactly are you using the term "social engineering" here -- it seems like you are using it as synonym for "plunder".

My impression is that opposition to "social engineering" is rooted in libertarian and conservative political traditions. I suspect that progressives (including utilitarians and Rawlsians, but not greens) would typically be comfortable with the idea. 

I define "social engineering" as a person standing above/outside society, and pulling strings to produce a particular outcome (actually, by that definition, most people approach politics with a social engineer's mindset).

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RE: Social Engineering

#6938 On Sat, 2008 11 29 22:39 ka1igu1a said,

The point was that if the State does not satisfy any notion of justice(the 3 i mentioned, and there is also a 4th, the egalitarian/Marxist theory of justice), then where is the legitimacy for coercion/intervention? I terms of "social engineering," I would define it as an illegitimate, coercive production of an outcome. The Drug War illustrates an example of what I am referring to. Take 2 students A,B in an inner city school. A ends up in prison because of the Drug war, B earns the necessary grades to, say, receive an ACG grant to attend college. Faux progressives like, say, Hillary Clinton, will point to B as a success story and clamor for, say, increased federal funds for college scholarships while putting the foot to the metal in terms of the Drug War. The outcomes of A,B together satisfy none of the 4 theories of justice(it is neither a libertarian outcome, a utilitarian outcome, a Rawlsian outcome, nor an egalitarian outcome). It is a socially engineered outcome.

Now why do so-called progressives politicians generally support the Drug War? Well, from a class theory perspective, it's not difficult to see why. We have a prison-industrial complex that demands a steady flow of "customers." We have unionized prison guards and police officers who are certainly not interested in seeing their ranks diminished (the Drug War is a full-employment policy for these groups).

True, libertarians would tend to use terms like "plunder" instead of "social engineering," but I was referencing a post by IOZ that specifically used that term. And I'm not sure how Rawlsians or Utilitarians could be comfortable with "social engineering" as defined. The Rawlsian is concerned with minimizing the worst-case outcome for A. Prison maximizes the worst case outcome for A. That's why the Drug War State is a deeply anti-Rawlsian device. The so-called Rawlsian who tolerates the Drug War as long as there is, say, progressive taxation, is as bad as the so-called libertarian who tolerates injustice just as long as there are capital gains tax cuts.

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learning something from Rawls.

#6935 On Sat, 2008 11 29 09:50 adam ricketson said,

The first obvious problem with Rawlsian justice carried out by the State is the notion that central planners can somehow make interpersonal utility comparison calculations to begin with. The second problem can be illustrated succinctly by the the likes of the Drug War, which makes a mockery of Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance" assumptions when it comes to impartiality of institutions, since the Drug War overwhelmingly and systematically impacts the poor and minorities. Rawls opposed libertarian justice because he thought it implied an unacceptable "standard of deviation" between those at the top and those at the bottom, but it's clear that the Progressive Drug War State itself is a deeply anti-Rawlsian Device.

I took a single Political Philosophy course in college, and the professor presented the Rawlsian school as the dominant school of academic political philosophers. I tried to learn what I could from Ralws and Co., but had a hard time getting past his opening arguments (it's all about intuition?!) and his initial condition (the "veil of ignorance").

Anyway, your second point (about the state often ignoring/harming the weakest members of society) also occurred to me, though I used other examples. This brought me to the conclusion that the Rawlsians and libertarians are really talking about two different issues: Rawls talks about what we should do with the power that we have (and assumes that all power is inherently concentrated in the state), whereas libertarians talk about how power should be distributed within a society.

Needless to say, I stuck with the basic libertarian approach to politics, but I think I picked up a few pointers from Rawls. If he is talking about how we should use the power that we have, then he is talking about I should use my personal power. From that perspective, my libertarian political advocacy should be focused on liberating the poor (the rich are capable of adovocating for themselves, if they wish), and of course, my own time and wealth should also be directed towards aiding the less fortunate. From this "personal" perspective, attempts to make interpersonal utility comparisons is much more resonable, since we don have an intuitive ability to do make such comparisons in personal relationships (Ralws loves those intuitions!), and the errors that we make are much more tolerable because there is a general social consensus that it is my perogative to decide who I help (whereas government administrators are supposed to be bound by law in all their acts).

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Theories of Justice

#6939 On Sun, 2008 11 30 00:34 ka1igu1a said,

All theories or conceptions of Justice center around the legitimate application of coercion by an enforcement agent/mechanism. In Libertarian Justice, legitimate coercion is typically prescribed as a defensive mechanism only. In other theories, such as Rawlsian or Egalitarian/Marxist, coercion can be pre-emptive or offensive. Utilitarian justice is agnostic to the nature of coercion as long as overall utility is maximized.

Rawls' point in employing his "Veil of Ignorance" argument is that if agents didn't know beforehand their lot in life, then agent preference would choose from a distribution of outcomes that outcome that maximizes the utility of the worst off. For example, consider a simple game of N players beforehand who are presented with N Slots, and they will randomly be be chosen a given slot. Slot 1 is, for example, where you are rich and famous. Slot N is where you are born with a disability and would find it challenging to be productive. If an agent is presented with an equal probability that he/she will end up in the top 3rd of the slots or the bottom 3rd of the slots, will such an agent choose beforehand a system of justice that held any agent i has no "coercive claim" over agent j(libertarian justice) or a system that held the bottom 3rd of agents have a coercive claim over the top third agents to improve their lot, say, by a progressive tax that funds programs like "Disability for Players" Act. Rawls held that under such "Veil of Ignorance," rational agents would prefer the latter over the former.

As I previously posted, Interpersonal Utility Comparisons IS a problem with Rawls conception of justice. Academically, for such a Interpersonal Utility Comparisons to hold, agents must satisfy what is known as the Harsanyi-Aumann condition, that is, that rational agents faced with the same information must draw the same conclusions. However, empirically, that's a dubious claim. Penn & Teller's BullShit! had an episode on the Americans with Disabilities Act where it featured guests with disabilities who were huge advocates of the legislative Act and other guests with disabilities who were fierce critics of the Act. Just a simple empirical example pointing out that Harsanyi-Aumann assumptions wouldn't necessarily hold true in my simple N player game scenario.

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Rawls' disembodied humans

#6944 On Sun, 2008 11 30 11:12 adam ricketson said,

I understand the structure of Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance", I just think that has nothing to do with reality. It's almost a religion: it treats humans as though they can be separated from their bodies (soul theory) and places the philosopher in the position of an all powerful God who can allocate resources to each of those souls. It basically negates the entire idea of "non aggression" or "self defense", because it treats individuals as totally passive elements of the game--as though individuals have no agency.

In contrast, the individualist philosophies are relatively empirical; the principle of self-ownership recognizes that people are material bodies with their own motivations.

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