I don't like the homesteading principle mostly because of there are the thresholds of labor and time required for establishing different levels of ownership. While a hunter might stalk and kill game on the free range and then claim the carcass of the animal as his own personal property, mining and resource extraction requires the construction of mines and transportation infrastructure, and farming would require improvements to improve agricultural yields. There are other ambiguities on which threshold of investment transfers ownership from one individual to another.

On the other hand, squatting and homesteading historically have been the best and most organic way for poor societies to develop into prosperous communities. Certainly, squatters are in clear violation of existing property rights in that they are trespassing on a negligent or unsuspecting owner. Perhaps, they are allowed to use the property in good faith that squatters would not destroy or damage it. In the end, there has to be some respect for existing property rights.

And then there's the issue of resource monopolization. I don't think anyone can really say that they are responsible for the minerals on their lands. The idea of owning the mineral rights for the land through the homesteading principle doesn't make sense. Construction of irrigation systems and farm plots or the construction of housing and lodging would give someone surface rights but hardly the rights to all the wealth embedded underneath the ground.

"Clearly there ARE instances in which occupancy/use would establish what a reasonable person would recognize as ownership."

I don't see what makes that "clear" at all. Right-wing libertarians need it to be clear because everything they believe in falls apart without it, but needing something to be clear and it actually being clear are not the same thing.

Of course, "respected right to use without interference" is an entirely different matter than "ownership", and societies can certainly organize in such a way as to create a positive right to the former without the absurd and tortured rationalizations it takes to pretend there's a natural right to the latter.

BOA sides with disgruntled workers

The two issues are at the heart of the type of coordination problems that confront market anarchist theory. The "Waco Model" would only apply as a possible defense mechanism employed by property owners against a gang of looters (i.e, those who have no legitimate claim). However, employing a "Waco Strategy" to resolve disputes that originally resulted from a unilateral action(in this case, stiffing workers of the fruits of their labor) is not solving the coordination problem. Firms that engaged in such unilateral practices would virtually guarantee that labor WOULD become unionized, which would be the rational strategy to "enforce" cooperation and coordination(the coordination problem is solved when there is no strategic advantage gained by unilateral action, meaning that unilateral action by one party either results in mutual losses(or gains) by both parties).

In the end, bargaining strategies aren't all about getting the most out the present situation. A lot of the negotiation strategy is setting up basis for future cooperation or preemption of future conflict. A lot of foresight is require to so that a firm or individual has solid ground to tread upon and isn't immediately confronted by another crisis.

The WACO strategy of stiffing workers would unionize present workers into a defensive alliance for a standoff and would dissuade workers from ever working for such a firm or firms with this group of management in the future. All in all it's a bad idea. The management has to balance their capability to pay the workers and the their obligations to the workers. Otherwise, they are just setting themselves up to fail in their next job.

Any idea on why BoA would take responsibility for the employer's obligation to these workers? Might it make the liquidation go more smoothly and allow the bank to recover more money? As a PR move, is it just to keep a good reputation with their customers, or is it to make sure that the Obama administration is willing to give them additional bailout money?

So, you seem to be saying that any decision by the property owners to forcefully evict the workers would be a big mistake -- at least without a prolonged negotiation that allows the owners to present themselves to the public as reasonable and the workers as unreasonable.

nm

If you look at "update 2" (response to Brad Spangler), Kinsella argues that there is no legitimate claim by the workers--that the severance payments are required by law, not by contract. In his book, that isn't legitimate.

Your comments about cooperation makes it seem as though "legitimacy" would be determined by community norms, not a particular ideology.

Libertarian Bio

This led me to veer more towards libertarianism, and then to anarcho-capitalism. Later I began to put more emphasis on Austrian economics and paleolibertarian insights of Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, and Rockwell.

Here's a nice exchange detailing
Kinsella's agreement with some of Hoppe's more controversial views

In terms of "shooting workers," he called them "vandarchists" and then linked to post quoting Rothbard what the appropriate punishment should be for them. I leave it up to the objective reader if his post didn't convey an implication that they could justifiably be shot as punishment.

Wow. As of 2006 his latest phase was "paleo". How could he consider that label bizzare?

For what it's worth, I fully agree that he did open himself to misinterpretation by equating the workers with vandals, and pulling out that "shoot them" quote. I tried to say that in the previous message, but I dropped a relative clause in an ambiguous situation.

See my article here: http://www.mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/Qjae2_4_4.pdf
I am in favor of restitution:

One interesting argument that Barnett makes, with regard to enforcement
error and abuse, is that all criminal justice should be restitutive, not punitive or
retributive. As I have argued elsewhere,30 I believe Barnett is mistaken that retribution
(punishment) violates the rights of (actually guilty) aggressors.31 However, in
keeping with his consequentialist approach which avoids questions of justification
of fundamental norms, Barnett does not pretend to make a strong theoretical case
for the rights of aggressors to be free from punishment.32
Indeed, most of Barnett’s concerns regarding punishment are warranted: he
opposes it because he believes it may deter crime less than would a restitutionbased
system, and also because the unavoidable possibility of error can lead to
“infliction of harm on the innocent” (p. 228, emphasis added; also pp. 197, 228).
Like Barnett, I am concerned about the unavoidable possibility of mistakenly
punishing the innocent, and thus admit the appeal of a restitution-based system in
order to avoid punishing innocents. Moreover, Barnett makes a powerful and
original argument for why the standard of proof should be higher if a victim seeks
to punish a purported aggressor rather than merely obtain restitution (p. 212).
Thus, a victim seeking to punish the aggressor must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, whereas the lower standard of preponderance of the evidence is more
appropriate for a civil trial for damages. It is therefore more costly to seek
punishment than to seek restitution. For this and other reasons, restitution would
probably become the predominant mode of justice in a free society.
Nevertheless, acknowledging (and justifying) the theoretical legitimacy of punishment
can be useful. For example, punishment (or a theory of punishment) may be
utilized to reach a more objective determination of the proper amount of restitution,33
because a serious aggression leads to the right to inflict more severe punishment on
the aggressor, which would thus tend to be traded for a higher average amount of
ransom or restitution than for comparatively minor crimes.34 Especially offended
victims will tend to bargain for a higher ransom; and richer aggressors will tend to be
willing to pay more ransom to avoid the punishment the victim has a right to inflict,
thereby solving the so-called “millionaire” problem faced under a pure restitution
system (where a rich man may commit crimes with impunity, since he can simply
pay easily-affordable restitution after committing the crime).
Moreover, even if punishment is banned (de facto or de jure) and is not an
actual option—because of the possibility of mistakenly punishing innocents,
say—an award of restitution can be based on the model of punishment. To-wit: a
jury could be instructed to award the victim an amount of money it believes he
could bargain for, given all the circumstances, if he could threaten to proportionately
punish the aggressor. This can lead to more just and objective restitution
awards than would result if the jury is simply told to award the amount of damages
it “feels” is “fair.” Barnett nowhere specifies any objective standards or criteria by
which a judge or jury is to determine the amount of restitution a victim is to receive
for a non-economic crime like murder, rape, and the like. He specifies only that the
aggressor must “compensate” the victim for the “harm caused,” to “restore” the
victim (pp. 159, 185). Thus, a retribution-based system, even if used only as a
model to help determine the amount or standard of restitutive damages, supplements
Barnett’s theory of a restitution-based justice system.