Where Policy is Going Wrong

Submitted by Captin Sarcastic on Thu, 2009-07-30 11:57.

As one looks at the political landscape of America, it would be hard to miss the simple fact that whether Republicans win or Democrats win, the American people lose. We have seen an attempt at Social Security reform that looked more like a trillion dollar stock broker commission, or health care reform that looks more like a trillion dollar premium check to the insurance industry. Good ideas, or even bad ideas, are consistently turned into policies that hand out cash, directly or indirectly, to the biggest players in the game. This happens because with respect to the political system of electing politicians in America, this program has been brought to you by the largest big money interests and industry lobbies in the world.

Statism, libertarianism, liberalism, conservatism, and every other “ism”, are shams in this environment because they are all talk, and when it comes to action, they spin sponsored legislation as if they were honest policies matching the rhetoric these people used during their campaign. The reality is that the most significant legislation in America either pays or protects various election sponsoring industries, or retards their potential competition.

There’s a name for this phenomenon, but we never hear it. Instead, we hear about the evils of liberalism or conservatism, we hear about how Democrats or Republicans are so wrong, and why, using concepts like self-reliance, or lack thereof, social responsibility, or lack thereof. And the sad reality is that none of these “ism’s” are inherently bad, and there are policies where each of these ideological positions could result in successful policies. There are people and groups that really could not care less whether policies achieve the stated goals, only that they serve the interests of their sponsors, and these sponsors drive policy more than any ideology ever has.

It’s called Regulatory Capture, and it is as pervasive as it is invisible. It is the hand that feeds. And worse, it is not just the hand that feeds the political system, on both sides, but also the hand the feeds the news/talk industries, as well as the think tank business.

The policies of Regulatory Capture can appear statist or laissez faire, authoritarian or libertarian, and often can be spun as being all of the above. Maybe President’s can be immune, maybe not, but is doesn’t matter, since Presidents don’t make laws. Maybe GWB really wanted to improve the Social Security system, but what was bouncing around Congress was a plan to improve money management fees on Wall Street. Maybe Obama really does want to make healthcare work for everyone, but what’s bouncing around in Congress seems more like what the insurance industry would write if they were told that something that seems significant needs to be passed by Congress and they get to make sure it just seems significant, but allows them to maintain the essential status quo.

Regulatory Capture can be regulation, it can be deregulation, it can be restrictions on business that make it difficult for small players to enter markets, it can be the elimination of restrictions that hide the activities of industries from the public eye or official review. But the common element that policies structured by Regulatory capture is that there is absolutely zero interest in accomplishing any policy goals and a total focus on accomplishing the goals of the sponsor. It doesn’t guarantee the failure of any given policy, but sure it makes failure more likely.

The most frustrating aspect of Regulatory Capture is that is so very well protected. The ability of lobbies to sponsor your Congressman is protected under the First Amendment as validated by Buckley v Valeo, the SCOTUS case that determined that money IS speech, and therefore the ability of lobbyists to spend cannot be restricted. So every four years, these various groups spend about four billion dollars and are rewarded with hundreds of billions in revenues, either through protection of their revenues, direct government largess, or other policies that help these sponsors maintain their edge.

I can’t support policies that preclude Americans from using their dollars as a megaphone, but I can support policies that prevent those megaphones from being so loud. That’s why I support public financing of elections. Let we the taxpayer foot that four billion of direct campaign support for candidates rather than allowing interest groups to use that funding to purchase policy. They can go out and pay for candidates that refuse public financing or they can pay for their own issue campaigns, but we could take these groups out of the equation for a new generation of politicians who want the freedom to be responsive to their constituents, not their sponsors.

Our system is too complex and requires too much faith in our institutions to do away with regulation, and it is too easy to manipulate to allow lobbyists to write laws. We can’t eliminate influence, nor would we want to, but we can, and must, reduce how that influence is applied, and how effective it can be in the current environment.

Public Financing

#7303 On Thu, 2009 07 30 22:51 ka1igu1a said,

if pervasive regulatory capture is the justification for public financing, then it likely stands to reason that the public financing laws themselves would be subject to the same regulatory capture(public choice theory). As outlined in this post, the effects of Mccain-Feingold have actually served to further entrench the "corporatist democracy," not allay such. The regulatory burden, placed on independent candidates, has created a much higher barrier of entry into politics. If candidates don't comply with the onerous regulatory burden(independent candidates don't have fully staffed legal teams), then the State will go after your personal assets. The same thing would likely happen in the case of public financing, which in all likelihood would make eligibility so cumbersome and burdensome, that only "mainstream" establishment party candidates would qualify for the funds. in the end, you would likely just end up further entrenching the corporatist duopoly party strangleholds.

The problem is not political free speech, but a government that consumes 40% of GDP. It's a bit naive to think that a government consumes so much is not going to subject lobbying. And really, if you ascribe to political democracy, the ability to organize and petition the government is a fundamental aspect of such a political arrangement. what would truly be frightening is to live under a government that denied such a right, which would be much worse than public choice lobbying.

Public Financing OPTION

#7304 On Fri, 2009 07 31 08:58 Captin Sarcastic said,

While I agree that a government that denies the right to organize and the petition the government would be anti-liberty, I don't see how the offer of optional public financing equates to these harsh prohibitions.

It is inescapable that crafting a public financing policy would be subject to the same kind of pervasive influence that impacts policy across the board, but here's the rub; In order to overcome the ruinous effects of regulatory capture in other policy areas, we would have to succesfully overcome that influence on every policy point, every time, for the foreseeable future. Whereas with public financing, we would only have to get it right once, and then the influence would be significantly diluted.

MY opinion is that the argument against this option is an argument that says it's too hard to do it once, so let's try to do it a thousand times with every policy that comes along.

I am not trying to eliminate influence, I think everyone's voice is valuable in the process, even the "evil" corporations and the "evil" labor unions, I believe we need to dilute the influence of pure spending.

If the problem is a government that consumes 40% of the GDP (and I disagree with this number, but that's irrelevant to the point), then why shouldn't we ask how much of that government spending is related to influence purchased as part of electoral process?

Clearly, there are significant obstacle to overcome to make a public option plan effective, and avoid the pbvious pitfalls of potentially protecting incumbancy, or simply changing where in the process the influence pervades our system. But I believe that this is the one fight, which if done right, can eliminate an endless series of fights, each as difficult as this one.

quick thoughts on financin

#7305 On Fri, 2009 07 31 19:50 adam ricketson said,

welcome.

I think this you are echoing the position of the ACLU.

Important point -- equality of influence is fundamental and one-man one-vote is not sufficient.

i think that ballot access rules are a good example of what public financing would look like.

there are many other reforms to the electoral system (and society) that could equalize influence

spending

#7306 On Sun, 2009 08 02 06:57 ka1igu1a said,

40% is the total of all government spending, not just federal.

An option is just an option to refuse, just like the public financing option is refused by the 2 major party candidates in the general election for president.

Frankly ,mandatory public financing with caps for all campaigns is a moot point, because it would just be struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, and rightly so.

Option to Refuse

#7307 On Sun, 2009 08 02 13:18 Captin Sarcastic said,

It seems like an easy dismissal to simply suggest that since the current public option is often refused, then any and all public option designs would be refused. I disagree with this argument. If the public option guranteed a certain amount of spending, plus offered to match opponents spending dollar for dollar if the opponent refused public financing, I really can't see why anyone would refuse. More importantly, think of the rhetorical advantage the publicly financed candidate would have. "I am beholden to my constituents, not my financiers!".

The cap on public financing, which seems designed to be insufficient, is, I believe, a perfect example of regulatory capture. It can be spun to address a desire on the part of the electorate to limit big money influence, but in fact does nothing of the kind.

I agree that any mandatory public financing legislation would be struck down by SCOTUS, which is why it must be voluntary, but the key is to simply make it good enough that it would not likely be refused.

People, corporations, industries, and other interest groups would be free to attempt to exert their influence, but just not in connection or cooperation with any candidate.

There are always flaws, but I think that the current system is tantamount to legalized bribery, and does not serve our nation.

unconstitutional

#7308 On Sun, 2009 08 02 17:56 adam ricketson said,

"plus offered to match opponents spending dollar for dollar if the opponent refused public financing"

I think that this has been ruled unconstitutional -- too much like punishing someone for not accepting the limit.

Any thoughts on election reform or media reform?

Unconstitutional?

#7309 On Sun, 2009 08 02 18:45 Captin Sarcastic said,

"I think that this has been ruled unconstitutional"

I am not aware of that ruling, Please tell me the case.

Election reform and media reform are irrelevant as long as the candidates are beholden to their financial backers.

I disagree with the fairness doctrine in principal, Though the prospect of broadcast media time being provided to candidates free of charge under the public interest clause of the broadcast rights might be valuable.

self-financing

#7311 On Mon, 2009 08 03 11:59 adam ricketson said,

The bonus matching funds are unconstitutional if they are triggered by self-financing of the opponent:

Davis v. Federal Election Commission
http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/supremecourtonline/certgrants/2007/davvfed

why are they beholden?

#7310 On Mon, 2009 08 03 11:46 adam ricketson said,

They need money because they need to buy media exposure with which to organize the electorate.

Besides

#7312 On Mon, 2009 08 03 12:53 b psycho said,

Much of the campaign finance rules fall harder on challengers than incumbents, simply because the ones already in power have more connections they can call on.

When it comes to ferreting out possible quid-pro-quo arrangements, disclosure requirements help. Problem is virtually no attention is drawn to who funds what candidates (and, more importantly, why) despite the existence of the info. Much as I'd like it if most of the electorate was made up of armchair wonks who'd gladly research each candidate & look at sites like OpenSecrets.org, some questions just don't get asked unless they end up in the media.

Quid Pro Quo

#7313 On Mon, 2009 08 03 16:07 Captin Sarcastic said,

Part of the problem with the whole quid pro argument is that election financiers claim they are supporting people who tend to support their positions anyway, and candidates claim the bills they vote for, though desired by their funders, were the kind of bills they would tend to support anyway. In many cases, this is theoretically true, but the devil is in the details. Often the most important (and potentially costly) aspect of a bill is just a few sentences in a 40 page bill. A lobbyist suggests the language, the Congressman inserts it, and they're both happy, while the nation suffers. There is no way to stop this kind of underhanded legislation without cutting the direct connection between big money interests and electoral success.

As far as protecting incumbancy, this is as tough as any aspect of a public financing option. I know that challengers often HAVE to spend MORE money to make a real challenge and if we made the funding equal, there is the potential of protecting the incumbant. The best suggestion I have for that is to prohibit campaiging by incumbants until some specific time period ahead of the election. I think this would serve the dual purposes of directing our elected officials to do their jobs rather than a perpetual campaign, and secondly to give potential challengers a head start. Another advantage would be the freedom from fundraising that seems to take up so much of our elected officials time.

On the Davis, there appears to be no such finding that public financing of matching funds to a privately financed campaign would be unconstitutional. The Davis case held that changing the fundraising limits asymetrically when a candidate was self-financing was a violation of the First Amendment, A perfectly legitimate finding, since the rules were not equally applied to the two candidates, therefore limiting the self-financing candidates freedom of speech as it relates to the messaging that can be purchased. My suggestion would not apply different rules to different candidates, other than if one accepts public financing, they cannot also accept private financing. The rules for privately financed candidates would be intact, and equally applicable to all privately financed candidates, so would not violate Davis.