Neutrality in foreign relations

A few days ago, I crossed path with a group of marchers who were apparently upset by Israel's bombing of Lebanon and the USA's continued support of Israel. They expressed this disquiet with signs reading “Free Palestine” and chants of “Over here, over there, US out of everywhere!” While I understand their anger, I was turned-off by apparent pro-Palestinian and anti-American bias among the protesters.

I am often uncomfortable with how Israel approaches its conflict with its neighbors, and I am unhappy with the USA's policy towards Israel. Unfortunately, the proposed alternatives seem to be drastic and simplistic (“US out of everywhere, now!”) or amount to nothing more than taking the “other” side in a foreign dispute (i.e. Pro-Palestinian rather than pro-Israeli). Crossing paths with the marchers awakened me to my dissatisfaction with both the status quo and the common alternatives, and set me to the task of expressing a foreign policy perspective that is both pro-American and pro-peace.

In essence, I want the USA to craft foreign policy from a position that is neutral towards other countries, in contrast to hegemonic strategy it has pursued since WWII. However, unlike the our neutrality policy from before WWII, I want this foreign policy to recognize our unmatched military and economic strength, our current engagement around the world, and our support for human liberty.

Below I have outlined a number of principles describing this foreign policy of “engaged neutrality”:

No allegiance to foreign nations: Our support or opposition of the policies of another nation are based solely on whether those policies promote peaceful relations among people. We will not act to generally strengthen or weaken a foreign nation outside of a state of war.
Respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations: We hold no opinion regarding the system of government of foreign nations, nor the governors of those nations. We will not attack or otherwise attempt to undermine the governing structure of any nation outside of a state of war.
Defensive military deployments: Military units will only be deployed to countries in which they are fully welcomed, and only to act in defense of that territory from external aggression.
Defensive war: Full war will only be declared in response to an attack on American soil, or systematic international aggression. We will not take sides in historical conflicts, border disputes, or internal conflict.
Free trade: During peacetime, we will only restrict trade with a country in response to ongoing theft of labor (slavery), and these restrictions will be lifted on the condition that the benefits of trade go to the workers as either wages or services. The export of weapons and dual-use items to an aggressor country may be prohibited.
Aid to victims of aggression: Economic aid will be provided to the victims of aggression to help them recover from violence and resist aggression. Aid may include “dual use” items that aid in military operations but can be easily converted to civilian use upon the cessation of hostilities.
Discouragement of aggression: We may engage in direct attacks upon military units of an aggressor country that are operating in a foreign country.

These principles are meant to define a foreign policy that is distinct from the current policy of the USA, but permit a smooth transition from our current policy. I think that the most striking change in policy would be an immediate opening of relations and trade with Cuba, and a return of Guantanamo to Cuba. In the Middle East, military aid to Israel would cease, but substantial economic aid could continue to help the Israelis repair the damage done by terrorist attacks.

This paradigm removes the USA from the role of dictating the resolution of hostilities, to acting more as a buffer against aggression while allowing others to slug it out on the ground. I expect that we would rarely engage in ground combat, and instead would participate in naval and aerial combat in the contested region.

I hope that this can serve as a starting point for the development of an overall “Freedom Democrat” foreign policy perspective. I'm sure you guys will find some problems with these principles, but I hope that some of it will be useful.

P.S. Before writing this, I did some web-research on American neutrality, and while I couldn't find anything directly relevant I found an interesting article discussing the American approach to the Iran/Iraq war, the first half of which is a overview of the pre-WWII neutrality policy and the post-war UN system. I also found an interesting collection of American films made during the early stages of WWII (1935-1939) and apparently attempting to influence public opinion on the war.

First of all, I don't like the phrase "engaged neutrality," is an oxymoron and it doesn't really represent the body of Adam's proposal. What he essentially laid out here is foreign policy mohism. Mohism was a pacifist philosophy created by the 4th Century BC Chinese philosopher Mozi. Mohism emphasizes notion of pacificism to the point that Mohists (my girlfriend like to pronounce the term "moists") would actually put a small army of fortification engineers between a seiging force and its target population center.

To boil Adam's points into a central guiding principles: 1) The U.S. treats all states that respect the Fundamental Human Rights Declaration the same, 2) it only acts militarily in the defense of itself or states that have asked for assistance, and 3) it can provide assistance to states that are recovering from warfare. Basically, U.S. foreign policy would be designed to discourage and minimize the potential for war.

One could argue that this is generally the baseline of U.S. foreign policy. Laid on top of this are decades of politics and strategy that resulted in some of America's more ambitious (and dubious) policies and alliances. So in essence, Adam is arguing that Freedom Democrats "reset" U.S. foreign policy and take a few steps back from its current excesses.

The problem is that history and politics are dirty topics. Sometimes circumstance thrusts you into a position of leadership or forces you to compromise your principles. Therefore, foreign policy needs to be flexible enough to bend in the wind of world events without breaking. Just look at the priniples Adam described: Allowing foreign military deployments (even if they are friendly) create winners and losers in a given region. What about the 1939 or the 1945 scenario, when another state was forcefully realigning and bullying the international community against the U.S.? Foreign policies also have to build in flexibility to accomodate the Congress. How is "neutrality" squared with the special interest politics of the legislative branch?

Adam is going in the right direction, but I would add a few principles. First, the U.S. should be willing to provide assistance to any government that is establishing or improving upon democratic institutions. Sometimes resources and expertise are the major roadblocks to lasting democratic reform and it makes good business sense to provide that kind of incremental assistance.

We should also commit ourselves to lobbying states to reduce tariffs and adopt free trade practices. More open markets are good for everyone, so being a member of the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and World Bank is good policy. We could even offer incremental security assurances or military assistance in exchange for increasingly free trade.

I am going to think about a counterproposal that builds on Adam's ideas this weekend - probably Sunday. There is utility in being the Federal Reserve of war, but there is also much utility in leading by example.

Thanks for the response, RE, I'm sure that you have a better understanding of foreign relations than I do so I look forward to your counterproposal.

Anyway, I'd like to clarify a few things:

1) If you can think of a better term than "engaged neutrality", I'd love to hear it. I tried to summarize the paradigm in a single term, and am sure that there are better summaries. In some ways, "engaged neutrality" is meant to be an oxymoron--if I were to just use established terminology, then I wouldn't be proposing anything new, would I? I wanted to emphasize that this paradigm embraces the essence of neutrality (in refusing to oppose particular nations or institutions, as such) without being "neutral" in the same sense that we traditionally think of neutrality (what we might call "strict" neutrality--which may be impossible anyway). It's sorta like the Christian paradigm of "love the sinner, and hate the sin".

2) "One could argue that this is generally the baseline of U.S. foreign policy.": I think that one would be largely wrong. Of course there is some of this thinking in U.S. foreign policy, but it gets overshadowed by our hegemonic strategy. Throughout the cold war we attacked many nations/regimes solely on the basis that they were possible allies of the Soviet Union...in other words, we were willing to suppress independence movements and intervene in civil wars solely to maintain geo-political superiority over an opposing alliance, even when our level of intervention was far above the level of intervention from our geo-political opponents. Perhaps that was a reasonable strategy during the Cold War (that's history now), but we seem to have continued that strategy even past the Cold War. If our attacks on Cuba were simply a part of the Cold War, then we should have normalized relations with Cuba after the break-up of the Soviet Union, but instead we have continued and even intensified our attempts to destabilize the Cuban regime. We still attack nations (Iraq/Iran) on the basis that they may be developing weapons systems that are only a fraction as destructive as our own weapons.

3) "Therefore, foreign policy needs to be flexible enough to bend in the wind of world events without breaking." I never meant for these principles to be encoded in laws. They are just guiding prinicples, and the actual policy would have to be crafted by the leadership according to the current situation.

4) "Allowing foreign military deployments (even if they are friendly) create winners and losers in a given region. " : Yes, but there's a big difference between causing a country to loose a border dispute by attacking troops in that region, and destroying the civilian infrastructure of that country by bombing any building related to the government (and even occupying that country). These different strategies create vastly different levels of resentment among the population of that country. It is also important for a nation to know exactly what action of theirs is causing them pain, and that if they cease that action that they will no longer have suffering inflicted on them. By limiting our military action to the scene of fighting, we make it clear that we are not fundamentally opposed to their nation, but we are only opposed to their actions in a particular location.

5 "What about the 1939 or the 1945 scenario, when another state was forcefully realigning and bullying the international community against the U.S.?" In the point about "Defensive war" I made the distinction between "systematic aggression" (what you just described) and localized disputes.

6. "Foreign policies also have to build in flexibility to accomodate the Congress. How is 'neutrality' squared with the special interest politics of the legislative branch?": I don't quite understand the basis for this objection. It seems like this is taking the perspective of a foreign policy professional, who needs to take into account the fickle behavior of his clients. I am thinking of this from the perspective of a regular citizen, or elected official. In other words, voters should expect their representatives to craft foreign policy according to these principles, and to explain their decisions according to these principles. Basically, if a Congressman is crafting foreign policy according to special interests, then he has no place being in Congress.

I agree that it is worth making a point about assisting emerging democracies, either by providing technical/material support for institutional reforms, or by creating "democratic facts on the ground" (such as literacy programs). If we took a restrained approach to military intervention, we'd have more than enough money for such programs.

Finally, I'm not sure if my paradigm represents "the Federal Reserve of war" or "leading by example". On the one hand (Federal Reserve) this paradigm takes a rather indirect and general approach towards intervention in military affairs, on the other hand (leading by example) it is much less aggressive than our current foreign policy and presents the possibility of a world at peace if everyone else were to follow the same principles, rather than a world where war is a normal way of doing business.

Just noticed James Leroy Wilson's "Netralizing with neutrality" at the Partial Observer.

In point 3 of the original post (Defensive military deployments), I neglected to include "outside of a state of war" as an exception to that principle.

In general, I meant for these principles to apply to our day-to-day foreign policy, and accept that should we enter into an all-out war (declared by Congress, of course), then these limitations no longer apply and we should do everything (within the laws of war) to defeat our opponent. Also, by point 4 (Defensive war) I think that we would have been justified in declaring war on the Taleban and invading Afghanistan.

Does your restriction of foreign alliances apply to relatively universal organizations, such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund? Does it allow the U.S. to join collective security arrangements like NATO? What about participating in NATO's military integration function?

Also, under your foreign policy scheme, does the United States become involved in organizations that promote economic development or democracy?

I don't want to give the impression that I disagree with you, I just need some more clarification on the long-term goals of your strategy.

I didn't intend those principles to exclude participation in international organizations -- as long as participation in those organizations is conditional upon those organizations promoting peace and freedom in the world. To spell it out, alliances should be limited to defensive alliances with free countries, and none of these organizations should infringe on our national soverignty.

NATO seems pretty benign to me -- I think that the USA has been the driving force in non-defensive use of NATO, so if we take a less-aggressive stance, I expect that NATO would follow. Also, as I recall, NATO requires consensus in order to act, so there's no threat to our soverignty there. I don't know much about the "military integration function" of NATO--I have no objection to it as long as it doesn't allow foreign commanders to have our soldiers to engage in non-defensive acts without explicit approval by the USA (I'm using the term "non-defensive" fairly broadly--such that if there is any question that the action is not defensive, then it should require explicit approval by the USA). I object to the continuation of military support to states engaging in aggressive behaviors.

As for the UN: I object to the fundamental goals of the "World Federalists", but as long as we can easily leave the UN (or veto military actions), I have no problem with it.

I failed to mention foreign development activities solely because I was focusing on military issues. I have no objection to participation in peaceful cooperation with anyone. The only possible reason I would object to such actions would be on financial grounds (but the cost of peaceful foreign aid is insignificant next to the cost of military intervention), or if the particular projects would tend to increase the power of tyrants.

In the above post, I forgot to mention international law-enforcement. This includes our participation in the international drug war.

This is kinda touchy, as it is impacted by our domestic laws. In general, I think that it would be good to aid foreign countries in their law enforcement efforts, as long as we are not pushing their domestic policy. For example, if a foreign country wants to prohibit cocaine production, then there's no problem in helping them eliminate cocaine production. However, if they don't have any innate interest in eliminating cocaine production, then I'd prefer that we don't try to encourage them to take up that task with incentives that are independent of direct aid in counter-drug activities.

Basically, I don't want it to look like we are buying their government (however, that doesn't mean that we can't buy out the coca farmers themselves)